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Impairment Losses: The Impact Of The First-Time Adoption Of The 




In 2010, Portuguese unlisted companies started to apply a new accounting frame of reference 
called Accounting Standardisation System (Sistema de Normalização Contabilística – SNC) 
based on IAS/IFRS. This paper seeks to analyse the impact of SNC first-time adoption 
regarding the accounting treatment of impairment losses. Portugal has been recognized as a 
Code-law country, with weak legal enforcement mechanisms, and conservative accounting 
practices. However, since 2005 Portuguese companies have been changing their financial 
reporting practices to a common-law institutional logic. Therefore, the present research setting 
might provide interesting insights to confirm if the differences found are due to management 
interests, rather than cultural issues. 
Differences found are neither due to cultural issues nor management interests. To 
mitigate political costs associated with their public visibility, larger companies present more 
credible financial statements that reflect their overall true financial and economic condition. 
This study is a valuable contribution to both the users of financial information and 
domestic standard-setters entities to help them understand and improve the impact of 
accounting standards. Consistent with Khalil and Simon (2014), it also contributes to the debate 
on the optimal flexibility permitted by International Financial Reporting Standards to improve 
reporting quality and reduce earnings management. 
 
Keywords: Impairment losses, IAS/IFRS-based standards, accounting, harmonization, 
financial reporting 
 







From 2005 onwards, Regulation (CE) no.1606/2002 of the European Parliament and Council 
enforced companies with securities traded on a European regulated market to apply the 
International Accounting Standards/International Financial Accounting Standards (IAS/IFRS) 
when preparing their consolidated accounts. Regarding the remaining companies, European 
member states were granted the freedom to choose which accounting model to use. In July 
2009, the Portuguese Accounting Committee (Comissão de Normalização Contabilística – 
CNC) approved a new accounting frame of reference called Accounting Standardisation 
System (Sistema de Normalização Contabilística – SNC) based on IAS/IFRS. The SNC 
superseded the previous Portuguese Accounting Plan (Plano Oficial de Contabilidade – POC) 
and was implemented by Portuguese unlisted companies from 1 January 2010 onwards. 
With the implementation of SNC, the impairment of assets became one of the 
innovating aspects of this new Portuguese accounting frame of reference. IAS/IFRS- based 
accounting standards, such as SNC, are strongly focused on the concept of fair value, 
possessing a vast set of disclosure requirements and allowing for an extensive application of 
fair value. This characteristic makes them different from almost every other domestic 
accounting frame of reference of several countries, including Portugal (Bae et al., 2008; 
Aharony et al., 2010). The SNC’s accounting standard that deals with impairment of assets is 
the Accounting and Financial Reporting Standard (Norma Contabilística de Relato Financeiro – 
NCRF) 12 (Impairment of assets). 
The present study seeks to analyse the impact of SNC first adoption regarding the 
accounting treatment of impairment losses. More specifically, it intends to understand if SNC’s 
accounting standards related to impairment of assets reflect less conservative accounting 
practices, and examine the potential explanatory factors for the differences found between the 
amounts of impairment losses recognized under POC and SNC in the transition period. 
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Prior literature has indicated several reasons for the recognition of impairment losses: 
economic cycles (Spear and Taylor, 2012); firm characteristics (Elliot and Shaw, 1988); 
earnings management (McNichols and Wilson, 1988; Jackson and Liu, 2010); tax purposes 
(Eilifseu et al., 1999; Watts, 2003; Baralexis, 2004; Lara et al., 2009). Therefore, the 
Portuguese setting was chosen for several reasons. First, since 2007, the Portuguese economy 
has been severely affected by the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, and more recently by the 
European sovereign debt crisis, characterized by economic recession and scarcity of liquidity. 
Spear and Taylor (2011) found that during periods of economic recession there would be a 
tendency for firms to present higher levels of impairment losses.  
Second, prior literature has found that the first adoption of any set of IAS/IFRS-based 
accounting standards will appeal to a certain degree of interpretation, judgments and estimates. 
Therefore, managers will have some flexibility in the recognition of impairment losses through 
the application of earnings management techniques, such as big bath (Jordan and Clark, 2004; 
Sevin and Schrorder, 2005; Jordan et al., 2007). Leuz et al. (2003) indicate that the magnitude 
of earnings management is on average higher in Code-law countries with low investor 
protection rights (e.g. European Latin countries, such as Portugal), compared to common-law 
countries with higher investor protection rights, which highlights the relevance of this research 
setting to assess if management interests influenced the recognition of impairment losses. 
Third, prior literature on the adoption of IAS 36 (Impairment of assets) among 
Portuguese listed companies has found that firms engaged in earnings management techniques 
(Alves, 2013a, 2013b). However, the present study is focused only on the first-time adoption of 
SNC accounting standards. Even knowing that SNC accounting standards are based on 
IAS/IFRS they were applied by Portuguese unlisted companies only in 2010 onwards. 
Moreover, Portuguese unlisted companies have a smaller dimension compared to listed 
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companies, less public visibility, and are basically family-held. Consequently, they are less 
scrutinized by relevant stakeholders and therefore it is expected different reporting incentives. 
Fourth, according to Gray’s (1988) cultural accounting framework, culture can impact 
accounting decisions, and conservatism/secrecy are the most significant accounting values 
associated with national cultures.  Doupnik and Riccio (2006) found that in a high conservatism 
(secrecy) country (such as, Portugal, Spain and Italy), accountants assign higher numerical 
probability to verbal probability expressions that determine the threshold for the recognition of 
items (disclosure of information). However, institutional and legal restrictions affect countries’ 
accounting environments (Leuz et al., 2003; Daske et al., 2008) and the effect of IAS/IFRS 
mandatory application relies on how they are implemented and the level of enforcement and 
reporting incentives in each country (Pope and McLeay, 2011). Portugal is a Code-law country 
characterized by a weak legal enforcement regime compared to Common-law countries (Leuz 
et al., 2003).  However, since 2005, companies in Portugal have been changing their financial 
reporting practices from a code-law institutional logic to a common-law institutional logic 
(Guerreiro et al., 2012). Hellman et al. (2015) argue that the adoption of IAS/IFRS (or any 
other IAS/IFRS-based accounting standards, such as SNC) has had a profound impact on 
diluting differences associated with cultural aspects. Once more, the Portuguese setting is 
valuable, in order to confirm if the differences detected in the accounting treatment of 
impairment losses are due to management interests, rather than to cultural issues. 
Finally, at an international level, there is a vast literature on the economic effects of the 
transition and implementation process of IAS/IFRS (Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005; Callao et 
al., 2007; Ding et al., 2007; Tsalavoutas and Evans, 2007; Barth et al., 2008; Daske et al., 2008; 
Morais and Curto, 2008; Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008; Lantto and Sahlström, 2009; Haller et 
al., 2009; Aharony et al., 2010; Armstrong et al., 2010; Beuren et al., 2010; Callao et al., 2010; 
Iatridis and Rouvolis, 2010; Devalle et al., 2010; Fifield et al. 2011; Liu, 2011). However, there 
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is a scarcity of research on the impact of the adoption of IAS/IFRS adapted standards by 
unlisted companies in specific countries. 
In Portugal, the impact of SNC adoption is under-researched. Existing studies are 
related to the analysis of factors influencing the preparedness of Portuguese unlisted companies 
to adopt SNC (Guerreiro et al., 2012a), the analysis of the degree of compliance with NCRF 7 
(Property, Plant and Equipment) (Botelho et al., 2015), the development of a fair value model 
for the dairy sector (Oliveira et al., 2015a), and the first-time adoption effects of SNC in the 
olive and cork tree cultures (Oliveira et al., 2015b). The present study seeks to overcome this 
research gap through the analysis of impairment losses associated with SNC first-time adoption 
and tries to answer Trombetta’s et al. (2012) appeal for studies of this nature, due to their 
valuable contribution for both the users of financial information and the proper domestic 
standard-setters entities in helping them understand and improve the impact of accounting 
standards. 
Main findings indicate that the differences found are neither due to cultural issues nor 
management interests. Size is a crucial element explaining the differences found in the 
accounting treatment of impairment losses under SNC and POC. Consistent with the political 
costs argument of Watts and Zimmerman (1986), larger companies show a higher level of 
divergence. To mitigate political costs associated with their public visibility, those companies 
tend to present more credible financial statements that reflect their overall true financial and 
economic condition. 
These findings contribute to the literature ongoing debate on the different economic 
effects related to the recognition of impairment losses in different settings and among different 
companies. Moreover, is also contributes to the ‘debate on the optimal flexibility permitted by 
standard setting’ (Khalil and Simon, 2014: 100) informing regulators, supervisory entities and 
auditors in understanding manager’s discretionary reporting choices permitted by accounting. 
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In the next section, we present the regulatory background regarding the recognition of 
impairment losses. In following section we present the literature review and discuss 
hypotheses. Thereafter, we describe the research method, report results, and finalize with 
conclusions. 
 
IMPAIRMENT OF ASSETS: LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 Within SNC, issues relating to impairment of non-current assets are dealt with in NCRF 8 
(Non-Current Assets Held for Sale and Discontinued Operations), NCRF 11 (Investment 
Property), NCRF 12 (Impairment of Assets), NCRF 13 (Interests in Joint Ventures and 
Investments in Associates), NCRF 14 (Business Combinations), NCRF 15 (Investments in 
Subsidiaries and Consolidation), and NCRF 16 (Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral 
Resources). Impairment of financial assets is addressed by NCRF 27 (Financial Instruments). 
Finally, impairment related to inventories is addressed by NCRF 18 (Inventories). The main 
differences between POC and SNC in terms of accounting treatment of impairment losses are 
shown in Table 1. 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
Prior research 
The economic effects of the transition and implementation process of IAS/IFRS have been 
studied in terms of: a) quantitative impacts of IAS/IFRS adoption (Guerreiro, 2006; Callao et 
al., 2007; Guerreiro et al., 2008; Lantto and Sahlström, 2009; Haller et al., 2009; Beuren et al., 
2010; Callao et al., 2010; Iatridis and Rouvolis, 2010; Navarro-García and Bastida, 2010; 
Tsalavoutas, 2011); b) IAS/IFRS adoption and its value relevance (Daske et al., 2008; Morais 
and Curto, 2008; Aharony et al., 2010; Armstrong et al., 2010; Devalle et al., 2010); c) 
7 
 
conservatism (Tsalavoutas and Evans, 2007; Fifield et al. 2011; Liu, 2011); d) IAS/IFRS 
adoption and earnings management (Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005; Ding et al., 2007; Barth 
et al., 2008; Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008). 
These studies are based on empirical evidence from European Latin and Greek settings 
(Sucher and Jindrichovska, 2004; Guerreiro, 2006; Callao et al., 2007; Tsalavoutas and Evans, 
2007; Guerreiro et al., 2008; Callao et al., 2010; Iatridis and Rouvolis, 2010; Navarro-García 
and Bastida, 2010; Tsalavoutas, 2011), and countries like the UK, Germany and Finland 
(Lantto and Sahlström, 2009; Haller et al., 2009; Beuren et al., 2008). 
However, in Portugal, the effects of IAS/IFRS adoption are under-researched, and so far 
existing studies have focused on the preparedness of companies to adopt IFRS (Guerreiro, 
2006; Guerreiro et al., 2008) and accounting quality (Morais and Curto, 2008). Consistent with 
table 2 (panel A), during the IFRS transition period Portuguese listed companies had to follow 
CESR’s (Committee of European Securities Regulators) disclosure recommendations, but only 
larger companies commercially internationalized, audited by Big4 auditing firms, and with 
lower leverage did (Guerreiro, 2006). The adoption of IFRS improved earnings quality, 
because companies reported less smooth earnings (Morais and Curto, 2008). However, very 
few companies were prepared to adopt IFRS, basically larger companies, with higher levels of 
commercial internationalization and audited by Big4 auditing firms (Guerreiro et al., 2008). 
Portuguese companies not listed on a Stock Exchange Security regulated market only changed 
voluntarily their financial reporting institutional logic (from a code-law institutional logic to a 
common-law institutional logic) if they would benefit from it (Guerreiro et al., 2012a).  
(Insert Table 2 here) 
On the other hand, studies on the adoption effects of IAS/IFRS adapted standards (such 
as SNC) have been scarce. Findings presented in Table 2 (Panel B) suggest that, generally, the 
degree of preparedness to implement SNC was low, but institutional factors (such as the 
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participation of the parent company in decisions regarding conversion procedures, the conduct 
of export activities, the presence of exclusively Portuguese shareholders, and the extent of 
reliance on consulting services) had a positive influence on the degree of preparedness 
(Guerreiro et al., 2012b). Moreover, institutional logics can explain SNC implementation 
(Guerreiro et al., 2015).  In terms of compliance level with disclosures requirements of specific 
SNC’s accounting standards, research indicates that company’s age, liquidity, profitability, 
foreign activity, and the type of auditing firm are significant determinants (Martins et al., 2014; 
Botelho et al., 2015). Regarding the innovative aspects of SNC, such as fair value, Oliveira et 
al. (2015a) found that market values for dairy production of animals are inconsistent, reducing 
comparability across the sector. However, SNC adoption led to less conservative accounting 
practices suggesting that cultural aspects and country enforcement regimes did not influence its 
adoption (Oliveira et al., 2015b). 
At an international level, research on impairment of assets has focused on the 
recognition, measurement, and disclosure effects of asset write-offs (Strong and Meyer, 1987; 
Elliot and Shaw, 1988; Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 2004; Zucca and Campbell, 1992; Rees et 
al., 1996; Deming et al., 2007; Siggelkow and Zülch, 2013), goodwill impairment accounting 
treatment during the transition year (Jordan and Clark, 2004; Sevin and Schroeder, 2005; 
Beatty and Weber, 2006; Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008; AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011) and in 
periods subsequent to the transition year (Jordan et al., 2007; Masters-Stout et al., 2008; 
Godfrey and Koh, 2009; Lee and Yoon, 2012; Iatridis and Senftlechner, 2014; Jordan and 
Clark, 2015), and the level of compliance with disclosure requirements regarding goodwill 
impairment testing (Carlin et al., 2010; Carlin and Finch, 2011; Guthrie and Pang, 2013; 
Kaiying Ji, 2013; Carvalho et al., 2016a) However, findings have shown mixed conclusions 
(Table 3, Panel A and B). Some show that asset write-offs and goodwill impairment can be 
used for strategic opportunistic management purposes (Strong and Meyer, 1987; Elliot and 
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Shaw, 1988; Zucca and Campbell, 1992; Francis et al., 1996; Jordan and Clark, 2004; Riedl, 
2004; Sevin and Schroeder, 2005; Beatty and Weber, 2006; Deming et al., 2007; Jordan et al., 
2007; Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008; Masters-Stout et al., 2008; AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011; 
Siggelkow and Zülch, 2013), as a response to changes in the economic environment of the firm, 
reflecting relevant economic information about a company’s performance (Rees et al., 1996; 
Godfrey and Koh, 2009; Lee and Yoon, 2012; Iatridis and Senftlechner, 2014; Jordan and 
Clark, 2015), and as a reflection of country-specific factors (e.g. differences related to audit 
function and accounting standards) and a firm’s corporate governance characteristics (Alves, 
2013a; Chao and Horng, 2013; Iatridis and Senftlechner, 2014). Moreover, regarding the level 
of compliance with disclosure requirements (Table 3, Panel C) prior literature has documented 
reduced levels of compliance regarding goodwill impairment and goodwill impairment testing 
(Carlin et al., 2010; Carlin and Finch, 2011; Guthrie and Pang, 2013; Kaiying Ji, 2013; 
Carvalho et al., 2016a). Carvalho et al. (2016b) provides an extensive and systematic literature 
review on goodwill and mandatory disclosure compliance and they corroborate these findings, 
concluding that enforcement mechanisms must be reinforced in order to improve information 
quality. 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
Regarding impairment of assets, few studies have been made in Portugal, hitherto 
(Alves 2013a, 2013b). These two studies assess the first-time adoption impact of IAS 36 among 
Portuguese listed companies regarding impairment of assets and goodwill impairment charges. 
Alves (2013a) found that firms impair their assets more often when earnings are unexpectedly 
low or high, suggesting either big bath or income smoothing behaviours. Big4 auditors give 
firms more discretion to engage in income-increasing earnings management by postponing 
assets impairments. When there are incentives to under-report earnings, assets impairment 
charges increase more among firms audited by non-Big4 auditing firms. Alves (2013b) found 
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that goodwill impairment charges are significantly positively related to earnings management. 
The subjective component in the determination of impairment charge by managers (such as the 
estimation of parameters like cash-flow and discount rate) give rise to earnings management 
behaviours. 
However, in Portugal, no study has been made about the impact of the first adoption of 
SNC by unlisted companies regarding impairment of assets. Gray (1988) categorized the 
European Latin countries (such as Spain, Italy, and Portugal) as those emphasizing 
conservatism and secrecy. SNC standards are not full IAS/IFRS. Instead, SNC is a set of 
IAS/IFRS-based standards. However, since 2005 Portuguese companies have changed their 
financial reporting from a Code-law institutional logic to a Common-law institutional logic 
(Guerreiro et al., 2015). However, Kvaal and Nobes (2012) and Lourenço et al. (2015) found 
that national patterns in financial reporting practices persist over time. Callao et al. (2007) 
concluded that after the adoption of IAS/IFRS Spanish companies continued to provide 
conservative financial information, most likely due to cultural issues. But Callao et al. (2009, 
2010) found that these differences were not related to traditional accounting systems. On the 
other hand, higher differences between IAS/IFRS-based standards and local GAAP (Ding et al., 
2007), mainly in periods of economic recession and scarcity of liquidity (Spear and Taylor, 
2011), imply more opportunities for management opportunistic behaviour, unless appropriate 
enforcement mechanisms are implemented (Leuz et al., 2003; Daske et al., 2008). Therefore, 
the present paper seeks to analyse if the recognition effects of impairment losses by Portuguese 
unlisted companies, during the transition period from POC to SNC accounting standards, are 
due to management interests, rather than to cultural issues. 
 




Conservatism relates to the ‘inclusion of a degree of precaution when exercising the necessary 
judgment to proceed with estimations under certain conditions so that assets or earnings are not 
overrated, and liabilities or expenses not underrated’ (SNC’s Conceptual Framework: § 37 – 
Aviso 15652/2009). Prior literature has demonstrated that impacts on the transition from local 
GAAP to IAS/IFRS have had significant effects on several captions of financial statements 
(Tsalavoutas and Evans, 2007; Fifield et al. 2011; Liu, 2011). Callao et al. (2007, 2010) 
corroborate this finding among British and Spanish companies concluding that due to cultural 
issues, Spanish companies present more conservative financial information. The economic 
effects of IAS/IFRS adoption impact on key accounting ratios (Lantto and Sahlström, 2009) 
and differences found are related to fair value issues and the recognition of construction 
contracts, tangible/intangible assets, provisions and contingent liabilities/assets, and business 
combinations (Haller et al., 2009; Lantto and Sahlström, 2009). 
In Portugal, when companies adopted SNC for the first time, if there were no 
differences between POC and SNC, all captions of financial statements would be equal. 
However, literature has been suggesting that, at least in the adoption of IAS/IFRS, those 
differences do exist (Bae et al., 2008; Aharony et al., 2010). In the first place, according to 
Regulation 1606/2002 from the EU, IAS/IFRS adoption promotes transparency and financial 
reporting quality. Second, because IAS/IFRS are strongly focused on the concept of fair value, 
possessing a vast set of disclosure requirements and allowing for an extensive application of 
fair value. This characteristic makes them different from almost every other domestic 
accounting frame of reference of several countries, including Portugal (Bae et al., 2008; 
Aharony et al., 2010). The level of conservatism is reflected on the amount of total assets, 
equity, earnings, and liabilities. Gray (1980) refers that conservatism can be measured by 
‘profits-measurement behaviour’. Thus, taking SNC as the yardstick, the following rationales 
can be established (Oliveira et al., 2015b): 
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a) If ‘total of assets’, ‘equity’, and ‘earnings’ under POC is higher (lower) than those 
under SNC, then POC accounting practices would be less (more) conservative than 
SNC accounting practices; 
b) If ‘liabilities’ and ‘impairment losses’ under POC is higher (lower) than those under 
SNC, then POC accounting practices would be more (less) conservative than SNC 
accounting practices. 
In SNC, accounting standards are based on IAS/IFRS, indicating that it is expectable 
that POC will continue to be more conservative than SNC, namely in the accounting treatment 
of impairment losses. However, Kvaal and Nobes (2012) and Lourenço et al. (2015) indicate 
that financial reporting practices persist over time.  
H1: The level of conservatism between POC and SNC standards is significantly different. 
 
Reporting incentives 
Prior research on the impact of IAS/IFRS adoption indicates that the level of preparedness of 
companies to adopt IFRS and the level of compliance with disclosure requirements in the 
transition process to IFRS were low (Sucher and Jindrichovska, 2004; Guerreiro, 2006; 
Tsalavoutas and Evans, 2007; Guerreiro et al., 2008). Only larger companies with higher levels 
of commercial internationalization, audited by BIG4 auditing firms (Guerreiro, 2006; Guerreiro 
et al., 2008), with strong debt and equity financing needs (Iatridis and Rouvalis, 2010), were 
better prepared to adopt IAS/IFRS and present higher levels of voluntary disclosure during the 
transition to IFRS. However, Tsalavoutas (2011) found that the industry sector, the auditor 
type, and changes in the 2004 shareholders’ equity/net profit as a result of the adoption of 
IAS/IFRS explain the levels of compliance with IAS/IFRS mandatory disclosure requirements. 
Moreover, Tsalavoutas and Dionysiou (2014) found that among Greek companies, the value 
relevance of accounting numbers differs across high-and-low compliance/disclosure 
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companies. The present paper does not study disclosures on impairment of assets, though. 
Instead, it seeks to examine the reporting incentives related to the recognition effects of 
impairment losses by Portuguese unlisted companies during the transition period from POC to 
SNC accounting standards. 
 
Size 
Larger companies possess more complex structures resulting in different patterns of 
impairment losses recognition compared to small companies. On the other hand, Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986) argue that political costs are higher for larger companies, those more easily 
scrutinized by relevant stakeholders (such as financial analysts). Thus, they will be more 
anxious to ensure that their financial statements are credible (Guerreiro et al., 2008), to process 
accounting information more efficiently (Chao and Horng, 2013), and create fewer incentives 
for manager’s opportunistic behaviour related to impairment losses (Kwak et al., 2009). Prior 
literature has found mixed results: a positive association between the recognition of impairment 
losses and companies’ size (Chao and Horng, 2013; Siggelhow and Zülch, 2013), negative 
associations (Sevin and Shroeder, 2005) and no association at all (Jordan and Clark, 2015). 
H2: The transition impact from POC to SNC on the recognition of impairment 
amounts is associated positively with company’s size. 
 
Profitability 
Guerreiro et al. (2008) argue that from a political cost perspective more profitable companies 
have stronger incentives in ensuring that their financial statements are credible and reliable. 
Thus, the recognition pattern of impairment losses will reflect the economic condition of the 
company. According to Godfrey and Koh (2009), US companies with a poor economic outlook 
recognize more impairment losses than companies with a strong investment opportunity. 
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On the other hand, prior literature indicates that the subjectivity underlying the 
assessment of impairment losses by managers may give rise to earnings management behaviour 
(Alves, 2013b). Earnings management can be seen as a possible explanation for the timing and 
amount of discretionary impairments (Zucca and Campbell, 1992). Prior literature confirms 
that to manage political costs managers have incentives to behave opportunistically overstating 
impairment losses through ‘big bath’ or ‘income smoothing’ behaviours (Strong and Meyer, 
1987; Elliot and Shaw, 1988; Zucca and Campbell, 1992; Francis et al., 1996; Jordan and 
Clark, 2004; Riedl, 2004; Sevin and Schroeder, 2005; Beatty and Weber, 2006; Deming et al., 
2007; Jordan et al., 2007; Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008; Masters-Stout et al., 2008; 
AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011; Alves, 2013a; Siggelkow and Zülch, 2013). ‘Big bath’ behaviour 
occurs in a year ‘when [the pre-write-off] earnings are already low [and the big hit is taken] 
because making things just a little bit worse by cleaning out the rubbish does little harm to 
either reputation or prospects’ (Jordan and Clark, 2015: 159). This enhances profitability and 
rate of return in the future. ‘Income smoothing’ occurs in a year when pre-write-off earnings 
are high and impairment losses are used to reduce earnings to the expected level (Zucca and 
Campbell, 1992). 
Studies from the USA (Strong and Meyer, 1987; Elliot and Shaw, 1988; Zucca and 
Campbell, 1992; Sevin and Schroeder, 2005; Jordan and Clark, 2004) found that impairment of 
assets charges is associated with big bath and income smoothing behaviour. Francis et al. 
(1996) found that both factors (opportunistic behaviour and poor past share performance) drive 
the recognition of impairment assets charges. Rees et al. (1996) found big bath reporting 
practices (pre-write-off earnings were, on average, lower than industry averages). But this 
reporting practice does not reflect opportunistic behaviours (negative abnormal returns in the 
write-off year did not reverse in subsequent years), suggesting that managers are responding to 
changes in the economic environment. However, Riedl (2004) found the opposite. More 
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recently, Jarva (2009) found that US firms opportunistically avoid impairments, even though 
this behaviour is closely related to economic factors, rather than opportunistic behaviours. 
Evidence from the UK context (AbuGhazaled et al., 2011) indicates that impairment 
losses are positively (negatively) associated with big bath (income smoothing) behaviours. 
Among Portuguese listed companies, Alves (2013a) found positive associations between 
impairment losses and both big bath and income smoothing behaviours. Based on these 
competing theoretical arguments and conflicting empirical results, the present study will 
examine the association between impairment losses and profitability without predicting its 
direction. 
H3: The transition impact from POC to SNC on the recognition of impairment 
amounts is associated with company’s profitability. 
 
Leverage 
In highly leveraged companies, one way to reduce information asymmetries between managers 
and debt holders is through the implementation of monitoring mechanisms (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Financial statements can be used to monitor these agency relationships. 
Following this argument, managers of highly leveraged companies have incentives to recognize 
higher amounts of impairment losses. These companies have the value of their assets under a 
frequent scrutiny from debt holders, forcing managers to adopt recognition patterns of 
impairment losses consistent with their private information about the economic performance of 
the company (AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011).  
On the other hand, credit agreements may contain debt covenants. The violation of debt 
covenants can lead to an immediate repayment claim from the debt holder, increasing corporate 
financial distress (liquidity risk). To avoid the violation of covenants, Watts and Zimmerman 
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(1986) argue that in highly leveraged companies managers have incentives to take a 
discretionary behaviour by recording less impairment losses. 
Consistent with these arguments, the association between impairment losses and 
leverage is not clear. Prior literature presents mixed results. Among US companies, Riedl 
(2004) found a negative association, but Godfrey and Koh (2009) did not find any significant 
association. AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) found a negative association among UK companies. 
Siggelkow and Zülch (2013) did not find any significant association. And finally, among 
Portuguese listed companies, Alves (2013a) after (before) controlling results for audit quality 
found a negative (positive) association. Based on these competing theoretical arguments and 
conflicting empirical results, the present study will examine the association between 
impairment losses and leverage without predicting its direction. 
H4: The transition impact from POC to SNC on the recognition of impairment 
amounts is associated with the level of leverage 
 
Tax measurement criteria 
Prior literature indicates that the poorest performing companies in the USA delay the 
recognition of write-offs to avoid technical violations of debt covenants or to delay the 
recognition of tax losses carry forwards until profitability is restored (Strong and Meyer, 1987). 
On the other hand, German companies smooth their earnings through write-offs with the intent 
to reduce tax payments (Siggelkow and Zülch, (2013). 
Like Germany, Portugal is a code-law country in which financial statements under POC 
were driven by prudence and creditor protection. These factors result in a tendency to recognize 
expenses sooner rather than later, and in good years rather than in bad. Moreover, in Portugal 
there is a close link between tax accounting and the accounting frame of reference, motivating 
companies to manipulate their financial statements (through income smoothing behaviours) to 
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reduce tax payments. Nevertheless, tax criteria to assess impairment losses are more objective 
than the underlying subjective accounting criteria and main differences are related to 
impairment losses in accounts receivables, inventories and fixed assets. Moreover, compared to 
accounting criteria, tax criteria are more restrictive when assessing impairment losses, leading 
to the recognition of lower amounts. 
POC accounting did not address when impairment losses should be recognized or how 
they should be measured. Like German companies, individual financial statements of 
Portuguese unlisted companies were characterized by high tax-book conformity (Siggelkow 
and Zulch, 2013). Graham and Smith (1999) suggest that under a progressive tax rate high tax-
book conformity reduces tax payments through income smoothing. But since financial 
reporting practices persist over time (Kvaal and Nobes, 2012)  the recognition of impairment 
losses might be closely related to purposes of tax conformity, rather than opportunistic 
behaviours. 
H5: The impact of transition from POC to SNC on the recognition of impairment 




Prior research found that CEO change is associated with managers’ opportunistic behaviour 
regarding the recognition of impairment losses (Elliot and Shaw, 1988; Francis et al., 1996; 
Riedl, 2004; Kvaal, 2005; Beatty and Weber, 2006; Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008; Masters-
Stout et al., 2008; Zang, 2008). However, companies in Portugal are family-owned. Families 
are by far the most frequent largest shareholder and are in control of the company (Lopes and 
Rodrigues, 2007). Therefore, Portuguese companies face few agency costs and the CEO is 
likely to remain unchanged.  
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On the other hand, several Portuguese companies are State-owned. The ownership 
structure – private and public – can influence managers’ motivations to determine their 
accounting policies regarding impairment losses. State-owned companies are more subject to 
pressures on the part of their stakeholders to disclose transparent financial information (Branco 
and Rodrigues, 2006). Another particular characteristic of Portuguese State-owned companies 
concerns the compensation schemes of its managers. Manager’s compensation is defined by the 
Government, it is indexed to Prime Minister’s salary and the law permits other compensation 
supplements linked to managers’ performance assessment, but restricted to a certain amount. 
These compensation supplements can be linked to the financial/economic performance of the 
company. 
Theoretically, among privately held companies the short-term component of 
management compensation is based on earnings-based bonus, and the long-term component 
can contain a stock-based bonus. Consequently, this may affect managers’ accounting choices 
and their preference for bellow versus above-the-line accounting treatment (Beatty and Weber, 
2006). Thus, they will have incentives to delay impairment losses to later years in order to 
increase current earnings (Siggelkow and Zülch, 2013). Beatty and Weber (2003) found that 
managers with earnings-based bonus plans are more likely to voluntarily report income-
increasing than income-decreasing accounting changes. However, Healy (1985) indicates that 
when current earnings are beyond the bounds embedded in compensation contracts, to increase 
future expected bonus, managers choose income-decreasing accruals. When the current level of 
earnings is within these bounds, managers may choose income-decreasing accruals. 
Prior literature has found mixed results. Among US companies Beatty and Weber 
(2006) and Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008) found a negative association between write-offs and 
management compensation. However, other studies did not find any association at all among 
German companies (Siggelkow and Zülch, 2013), UK companies (AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011), 
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and Egyptian companies (Khalil and Simon, 2014). Among Portuguese unlisted companies it is 
very difficult to collect information about management compensation schemes, because they 
are not obliged to report them. Due to unavailability of detailed data, and consistent with Khalil 
and Simon (2014), we used ownership structure – private and public – as a proxy for the 
management compensation variable. Managers from privately held companies have more 
incentives to act in a more discretionary manner than managers from state-owned companies. 
H6: The impact of the transition from POC to SNC on the recognition of impairment 




Out of the Biggest 500 Companies from the Exame Magazine ranking in 2010, we selected the 
companies whose individual annual reports for 2009 and 2010 had been published in their web 
sites. SNC was approved and published through the Decree-Law no. 158/2009. After its 
publication the Portuguese regulation established the following accounting regime: 
1) when preparing their consolidated accounts: 
a. companies with securities traded on a European regulated market had to apply 
IAS/IFRS (Regulation (EU) no. 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and 
Council). 
b. companies with no securities traded on a European regulated market had the 
option to apply IAS/IFRS instead of SNC standards (Decree-Law no. 158/2009). 
However, their financial statements should be subject to statutory auditing. 
c. all the other companies had to apply SNC standards (Decree-Law no. 158/2009). 
2) when preparing their individual accounts: 
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a. companies with securities traded on an European regulated market had to apply 
IAS/IFRS (Regulation no. 11/2005 from the Portuguese Stock Exchange 
Commission – (CMVM – Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários)), and 
must be subject to statutory auditing. 
b. companies with no securities traded on an European regulated market, but 
included in the consolidation perimeter, had the option to apply IAS/IFRS 
instead of SNC standards (Decree-Law 158/2009). However, their financial 
statements should be subject to statutory auditing. 
c. all the other companies had to apply SNC standards (Decree-Law no. 158/2009). 
 Consequently, from the individual annual reports initially downloaded from companies’ 
web sites, we excluded those which in 2010 had (chosen) to apply IAS/IFRS, when preparing 
their individual annual reports. We also removed all Trusts and Holding companies due to their 
specific purposes and regulations. The final sample comprises a total of 43 Portuguese non-
listed companies that applied the new Portuguese accounting frame of reference, SNC, in 2010. 
 
Measurement of variables  
The individual annual reports from the 43 Portuguese companies for the periods of 2009 and 
2010 were analysed. In 2010, Portuguese unlisted companies were required to restate their 
2009 financial statements according to the new accounting frame of reference. This would 
allow companies to present in 2010 both the end-period data of the financial statements and its 
comparatives under SNC. The present study analyses the following financial statements: the 
end-period data of the financial statements from 2009 (under POC) and the initial period data 
of the financial statements from 2010 (under SNC). According to prior literature (Aharony et 
al., 2010; Callao et al., 2010; Tsalavoutas, 2011; Oliveira et al., 2015b) we have extracted  the 
following information:  
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 Amount of total assets under POC and SNC;  
 Amount of equity under POC and SNC; 
 Amount of liabilities under POC and SNC; 
 Amount of earnings under POC and SNC; 
 Amount of impairment losses under POC and SNC.  
 
The amount of impairment losses include all impairment losses recognized less the 
reversals of impairment losses. According to Aharony et al. (2010), a comparability index for 
impairment losses (CIIL) in company i was created and calculated as follows: 
                                                CIILi = 
   i       i     
   i    
                                                     (1) 
where 
ILi SNC = amount in Euros of impairment loss, according to SNC, in company i; 
ILi POC = amount in Euros of impairment loss, according to POC, in company i; 
This comparability index measures the degree of divergence between the amounts 
recognized as impairment losses at the date of transition from POC to SNC. A comparability 
index near zero indicates that the amounts recognized are similar, according to both legal 
frameworks. A comparability index higher than zero would mean that the values recognized as 
impairment losses according to SNC are higher or lower than the recognized amount according 
to POC. 
Table 4 presents the definitions of independent variables, as well as the expected signal 
aligned with the proposed hypotheses. 
(Table 4 about here) 
  The variable ‘size’ was measured by total assets of company i in the period t-1. The use 
of this proxy is consistent with prior literature (AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011; Chao and Horng, 
2013; Siggelkow and Zulch, 2013). 
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  The variable ‘profitability’ was measured by return on assets (ROA) (Jordan and Clark, 
2015; AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011) and Earnings growth rate (Deming et al., 2007). Income was 
corrected for taxes and impairment losses. Return on assets will help capture firm-specific past 
performance (AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011). Consistent with big bath arguments, it is expected that 
the poorer the firm’s past performance (ROA), the greater the magnitude of reported 
impairment losses (Francis et al., 1996; AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011; Jordan and Clark, 2015). On 
the other hand, consistent with income smoothing arguments, it is expected that the healthier 
the firm’s past performance (ROA), the greater the magnitude of reported impairment losses 
(Zucca and Campbell, 1992). 
  Jordan and Clark (2015) argue that if a company experiences a negative (positive) 
income in the year impairment losses are recorded and a positive income immediately prior to 
the impairment year, it is likely that impairment loss has been used opportunistically as a ‘big 
bath’ behaviour (‘income smoothing’ behaviour). Consistent with Francis et al. (1996) and 
Siggelkow and Zülch (2013), to assess earnings management through income smoothing and 
big bath accounting we used earnings growth rate. If earnings growth rate in t is unexpectedly 
low (high), earnings management can potentially take a negative (positive) value consistent 
with ‘big bath’ (‘income smoothing’) accounting. 
  The variable ‘leverage’ was measured by the ratio of total liabilities of company i in the 
year t-1 to total assets of company i in the year t-1, and captures the tightness and proximity of 
firms to violation of their debt covenants (AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011; Siggelkow and Zülch, 
2013). Duke and Hunt (1990) state that leverage can be used as a proxy for the closeness to 
debt covenants restrictions, and the choice between the ratio debt to equity and debt to assets 
does not play an important role. 
  The variable ‘tax measurement criteria’ was assessed by a dummy variable assigning 
the value ‘1’ if the company adopts tax measurement criteria to assess impairment losses, and 
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‘0’ otherwise. Prior research has found that impairment losses can be used to manage tax 
payments (Strong and Meyer, 1987; Siggelkow and Zülch, 2013). Marques et al. (2011) found 
that Portuguese companies manage discretionary accruals to reduce tax payments. 
Theoretically, in countries whose accounting and tax systems are closely related, managers 
have incentives to reduce tax payments (Coppens and Peek, 2005). On the other hand, under 
POC it was very common to find companies following tax criteria to assess the amount of 
impairment losses. Since Kvaal and Nobes (2012) argue that accounting practices persist over 
time, the recognition of impairment losses is expected to be linked to purposes of tax 
conformity, rather than opportunistic behaviour. 
  Prior research has found an association between the recognition of impairment losses 
and management compensation (Beatty and Weber, 2006; Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008). 
Management compensation schemes in privately held and State-owned companies are 
completely different (in State-owned companies management compensation is determined by 
law and is not indexed to company financial success). Thus, managers from privately held 
companies have incentives to manage discretionary accruals to maximize their compensation. 
Among unlisted Portuguese companies, it is very difficult to assess the amounts of management 
compensation. To proxy for ‘management compensation’, we used the variable ownership 
structure measured by a dummy variable assigning the value ‘1’ if the company is privately 
held, and ‘0’ if State-owned. 
 
Empirical model 
The estimation model used to test if the identified factors have affected the recognition of 
impairment losses in the transition period from POC to SNC is: 
GCIILi = 0 + 1 Sizei + 2 Return on assetsi + 3 Earnings growth ratei + 4 Leveragei + 5 





Descriptive analysis  
Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics for both dependent and independent variables. 
(Table 5 about here) 
The minimum value in the CIIL is zero. Such a result indicates that some companies 
reported the same amount of impairment loss under both accounting frames of reference. But 
the mean value is 1.979, suggesting that the values recognized as impairment losses according 
to SNC are divergent from those in POC. However, CIIL presents a maximum value of 40.945. 
This result relates to a company that had recognized reversals of impairment losses of 0.355 
MEuros in POC, but which had only recognized 0.008 MEuros in SNC, at the date of 
transition. The company took advantage of the transition period to recognize impairment losses 
not acknowledged until that date. Impairment losses are closely linked to fair value issues. Prior 
literature on IFRS adoption has concluded that main differences are justified by accounting 
treatment of fair value (Callao et al., 2007; Lantto and Sahlström, 2009). 
The variable ‘Return on Assets’ presents a mean value of 0.014. This value is positive 
but considerably low. Results indicate that some companies have negative ROA (minimum = -
0.324) and considerably high ROA (maximum = 0.44), and according to literature there is a 
potential incentive for companies to engage in big bath/income smoothing accounting (Francis 
et al., 1996; AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011; Jordan and Clark, 2015; Zucca and Campbell, 1992).  
On average, between the period t-1 and t, earnings have grown 0.369. Once again, some 
companies show a negative earnings growth rate (minimum = -1.288) and others a very 
positive one (maximum = 3.762). Consistent with Francis et al. (1996), Siggelkow and Zülch 
(2013), and Jordan and Clark (2015), this indicator suggests that companies may have had 
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incentives to engage in earnings management through income smoothing or big bath 
accounting. 
The mean value for the variable ‘leverage’ ratio is high (mean value = 1.039), 
suggesting that companies rely heavily on banking financing. Once again, managers have 
incentives to delay the recognition of impairment losses to avoid debt covenants violations 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) or to assume all impairment losses in case their credit 
agreements do not have contracting restrictions and debt holders exercise scrutiny over 
impairment losses (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Concerning the assessment of impairment losses, companies have to clearly indicate in 
the notes to financial statements the criteria used: tax criteria or accounting criteria. Around one 
tenth of the companies analysed indicate in their annual reports that they had applied tax 
criteria to measure impairment losses. The other 91% of the companies explicitly said they had 
applied accounting criteria. The remaining companies did not disclose information on this 
topic. Finally, the sample included 23 (54%) privately-held companies and 20 (46%) State-
owned companies 
Table 6 presents the results of Wilcoxon tests to assess significant differences on the 
mean values of some captions from the balance sheet and income statement prepared according 
to POC and SNC, and shows if POC accounting standards are more conservative than SNC 
accounting standards, as foreseen in hypothesis H1. Results indicate that the total amount of 
assets, equity, liabilities, and pre-impairment losses & tax earnings in POC and in SNC were 
not significantly different (p-value > 0.05). Hypotheses H1 is not supported. Thus, according to 
Gray (1988), the levels of conservatism between POC and SNC accounting standards are not 
significantly different. Our results are consistent with the arguments of Kvaal and Nobes (2012) 
and Lourenço et al. (2015): financial reporting practices persist over time. Accordingly, 
findings show that the adoption of SNC did not lead to a higher/lower level of conservatism, 
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even concerning the amounts of impairment losses recognized. Consistent with Hellman et al. 
(2015), the adoption of SNC diluted differences associated with cultural aspects. 
(Table 6 about here) 
Table 7 shows the results of Mann-Whitney U tests used to analyse the differences on 
the mean (median) values of the CIIL between the different measurement criteria used. Results 
indicate that the amount of impairment losses is not significantly different (p-value > 0.05) 
between companies that have and have not adopted tax measurement criteria to assess 
impairment losses.  
(Table 7 about here) 
Table 8 shows the results of Mann-Whitney U tests used to analyse the differences on 
the mean values of firms’ characteristics among companies with a high/low impact of 
transitional impairment losses.  High/low impact of transitional impairment losses was assessed 
by assigning the value ‘1’ if the CIIL in company i was higher than its mean value (mean value 
= 1.979), and ‘0’ otherwise. Only five companies had a high impact of transitional impairment 
losses. These companies have higher values for total assets, total liabilities, equity, are more 
leveraged, and have a negative ROA. Prior to the recognition of transitional impairment losses 
companies had a negative performance, but earnings evolved favourably (earnings growth 
rate), which is inconsistent with arguments of management opportunistic behaviour. Pre-
impairment losses & tax earnings are more negative, and on average companies recognized 
more reversals of impairment losses. However, findings indicate that the differences are not 
statistically significant (p-value > 0.05).  
(Table 8 about here) 
Regression analysis 
Consistent with prior research among Portuguese listed companies (Alves 2013a, 2013b), 
hypotheses were tested using ordinary least-squares multiple regression to assess the existing 
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inter-connections between the several independent variables and the comparability index for 
total impairment losses. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test suggested that the dependent variable 
and the original independent variables did not follow a normal distribution. To overcome this 
problem and to avoid any potential non-linearity relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables, we followed Cooke (1998) and both dependent and independent 
variables were transformed by computing normal scores using Blom’s transformation.  
A correlation matrix was constructed after the original variables’ transformation. 
Results from Table 9 present a statistically significant negative correlation between ‘CIIL’ and 
‘Return on assets’ (p-value < 0.05). This relation indicates that companies with lower ROA 
present higher levels of divergence in the amounts of transitional impairment losses, which is 
consistent with arguments that these differences may be due to management interests. On the 
other hand, findings also indicate a statistically significant positive correlation between ‘CIIL’ 
and ‘Size’ (p-value < 0,05) and ‘Leverage’ (p-value < 0.05). According to political cost 
argument (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986), because these companies are highly leveraged and 
rely heavily on banks, they are easily scrutinized by relevant stakeholders (e.g. debt-holders) 
managers have incentives to process accounting more efficiently, rather than act 
opportunistically. Therefore, financial statements reflect the company’s overall true financial an 
economic condition. This is consistent with findings among US companies (Rees et al., 1996; 
Jarva, 2009). The remaining correlations across the several independent variables are low, 
indicating low levels of multicollinearity. 
(Table 9 about here) 
The assumptions of the regression model have been tested, namely concerning the 
levels of autocorrelation, multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, outliers, influential observations 
and normality of residuals. Regarding outliers and influential observations, results did not 
evidence their existence. Table 10 indicates that the value inflated factors (VIF) evidenced the 
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absence of multicollinearity problems (VIF < 2.293). Autocorrelation is minimal (Durbin-
Watson = 2.161). 
(Table 10 about here) 
Table 10 shows the results of the regression model, revealing through the F statistics 
that the model is statistically significant (p-value < 0.05) for GCIIL, with an explanatory power 
(adjusted R
2
) of 0.202. Table 7 shows that CIIL is associated positively with ‘size’ and ‘tax 
measurement criteria’ (p-value < 0.05). Results support hypothesis H2 (size) and H5 (tax 
measurement criteria). Larger companies present higher differences in the amounts of 
impairment losses recognized under POC and SNC in the transition period. Consistent with 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986), political costs are an important element to manage when dealing 
with impairment losses, mainly related to changes in the accounting frame of reference. 
Accordingly, they release credible financial statements demonstrating fewer incentives for 
manager’s opportunistic behaviour (Guerreiro et al., 2008; Kwak et al., 2009; Chao and Horng, 
2013). On the other hand, companies that had adopted tax measurement criteria to assess 
impairment losses present higher levels of divergences in the amounts of impairment losses 
recognized under POC and SNC. According to Table 8, companies with a higher level of 
divergence are characterized by larger size, low financial performance (negative ROA), but 
positive earnings growth rate. As discussed previously, this profile is inconsistent with 
arguments of manager opportunism. Consequently, we can conclude that companies who had 
adopted tax measurement criteria present higher levels of divergences for tax-book conformity, 
rather than for reduction of tax payments. 
Results from Table 10 show that CIIL is not statistically associated with ‘return on 
assets’, ‘earnings growth rate’, ‘leverage’, and ‘management compensation’. Hypotheses H2 
(profitability), H3 (leverage), and H6 (management compensation) are not supported.  In 
contrast to previous literature, in which managers use impairment losses opportunistically, to 
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avoid the violation of debt covenants or manage management compensation (Strong and 
Meyer, 1987; Elliot and Shaw, 1988; Zucca and Campbell, 1992; Francis et al., 1996; Beatty 
and Weber, 2006; Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008), these findings indicate that companies did 
not evidence ‘big bath’ or ‘income smoothing’ behaviours. Once more, consistent with Watts 
and Zimmerman (1986), in the recognition of impairment losses managers chose to reflect the 
economic condition of the company, and consequently manage their political costs related to 
changes in the accounting frame of reference. Alves (2013a, 2013b) is focused on impairment 
losses reporting incentives among Portuguese listed companies. But, the present study is 
focused on Portuguese unlisted companies. These findings do not corroborate Alves (2013a, 
2013b) conclusions, exhibiting the existence of different reporting incentives between 
Portuguese listed and unlisted companies. 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
This study intended to analyse the impact of SNC first adoption regarding the accounting 
treatment of impairment losses under two aspects. First, it aimed to understand if SNC 
accounting treatment of impairment losses reflects less conservative information. Second, to 
examine if differences found are due to management interests. 
Findings reveal that the accounting treatment of impairment losses under SNC is not 
significantly different from the one under POC. Prior literature confirms that Portugal 
(compared to other Common-law countries) has cultural features that have a positive impact on 
more conservative/secrecy financial information (Doupnik and Riccio, 2006). Results indicate 
that the differences detected in the accounting treatment of impairment losses are not due to 
cultural aspects. Consistent with Hellman et al. (2015), in the transition period, the first 
adoption of SC helped dilute differences associated with cultural issues. 
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Moreover, managers did not behave opportunistically when dealing with impairment 
losses, during the transition period to SNC. Results did not indicate any pattern of ‘big bath’ or 
‘income smoothing’ behaviour. On the other hand, consistent with the political costs argument 
of Watts and Zimmerman (1986), size is a crucial aspect in explaining the differences found. 
Larger companies are easily scrutinized by their relevant stakeholders. Therefore, to manage 
political costs, they are more anxious to ensure that their financial statements are credible 
(Guerreiro et al., 2008) and reflect the economic condition of the company (Godfrey and Koh, 
2009). Companies that have adopted tax measurement criteria have also shown a higher level 
of divergence in the amount of impairment losses under the two accounting frames of 
reference. 
Prior literature among Portuguese listed companies indicates that they engaged in 
opportunistic behaviours when dealing with impairment losses (Alves, 2013a, 2013b). This is 
consistent with prior research in other countries (Strong and Meyer, 1987; Elliot and Shaw, 
1988; Zucca and Campbell, 1992; Francis et al., 1996; Jordan and Clark, 2004; Riedl, 2004; 
Sevin and Schroeder, 2005; Beatty and Weber, 2006; Deming et al., 2007; Jordan et al., 2007; 
Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008; Masters-Stout et al., 2008; AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011; Siggelkow 
and Zülch, 2013). However, our findings highlight different reporting incentives, also 
consistent with previous literature (Rees et al., 1996; Godfrey and Koh, 2009; Lee and Yoon, 
2012; Iatridis and Senftlechner, 2014; Jordan and Clark, 2015): impairment losses were used to 
reflect relevant economic information about a company’s performance. 
Like in other Latin European countries, the basis for Portugal’s corporate regulatory 
regime is an institutional Code-law logic, rather than Common-law. However, since 2005, 
Portuguese public companies have been required to apply IAS/IFRS and therefore change their 
financial reporting institutional logic. This new regulatory context has had an impact on 
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accountants’ mindsets. Our findings may ultimately be a reflection of this progressive change 
of consciousness surrounding the new institutional logic of financial reporting.  
On the other hand, it is very interesting contrasting these findings with those from a 
different research stream: the degree of compliance with disclosure requirements regarding 
goodwill impairment and impairment testing. It is well known that higher quality information 
on impairment losses mitigates investors’ uncertainties about their future prospects and cash 
generating ability, with potential benefits regarding lower costs of capital (Mazzi et al., 2013; 
Iatridis and Senftlechner, 2014) and higher relevance of these items in the market 
(Baboukardos and Rimmel, 2014). However, previous literature has also documented reduced 
levels of compliance with disclosure requirements (Carlin et al., 2010; Carlin and Finch, 2011; 
Guthrie and Pang, 2013; Kaiying Ji, 2013; Carvalho et al., 2016a) with negative implications 
on the quality of information. Moreover, Carvalho et al. (2016b) stresses several reasons for 
these levels of non-compliance, such as: heterogeneity of disclosures among companies and 
countries; potential cultural phenomenon impacting on different reporting styles; disclosure of 
scarce, vague, incomplete, and inadequate information, basically due to the technical 
complexity surrounding impairment testing; or even reporting ‘formula’ that has remained 
virtually unchanged over the years. 
Consequently, our findings are of interest to regulatory and supervisory entities in 
understanding managers' reporting choices to determine how the discretion afforded by 
accounting standards may be exploited. But most of all, warns them to the crucial need in 
implementing enforcement mechanisms capable in promoting greater compliance with 
disclosure requirements, greater transparency, understandability, and usefulness of information. 
In addition, our results are also of interest to auditors because they can act as enforcement 
mechanisms with the potential to reduce management opportunistic behaviours and display 
lowers costs of capital (Iatridis and Senftlechner, 2014).  
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These findings also contribute to the literature regarding the ongoing debate on the 
different economic effects related to the recognition of impairment losses in different settings 
and among different companies. 
Finally, as suggested by Khalil and Simon (2014: 100), these results ‘implicitly 
contribute to the debate on the optimal flexibility permitted by standard setting and the 
argument that tightening the accounting standards and mandating International Financial 
Reporting Standards are likely to improve reporting quality and reduce opportunistic earnings 
management’. Therefore, these results can inform recent endeavours promoted by regulatory 
entities in debating topics such as goodwill and impairment test, such as the recent European 
Financial Reporting Advisory Group’s Discussion Paper Goodwill and Impairment test: can it 
be improved?  
Future research may consider the analysis of impairment losses recognition patterns 
after the transition period to SNC and assess if managers present, or not, opportunistic 
behaviours. Larger samples may also be used and other research settings may also include 
European countries that have recently changed their financial reporting institutional logics and 
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Table 1 – Differences in the accounting treatment of impairment of assets under SNC and POC 
NCRF SNC POC 
NCRF 12 (Impairment 
of Assets 
Impairment loss: difference 
between the carrying amount of 
an asset and its recoverable 
amount. 
 
Recoverable amount is the highest 
of the following values: fair value 
less selling costs or value in use. 
 
Impairment tests should be made 
annually. 
 
Impossibility to test the 
impairment of an individual asset: 
assessment of the recoverable 
amount of the cash-generating 
unit. 
 
Impairment tests on goodwill 
should be made annually. 
Reversals of impairment losses 
are not permitted. 
 
Disclosures are required. 
Whenever property, plant or 
equipment assets or even 
intangible assets are overvalued 
they should be subject to an 
exceptional 
depreciation/amortization, if the 
value of that reduction is 
foreseen as permanent. 
 
Any methodologies are 
proposed. 
 
The period to test impairment is 
not established. 
 






Inventories are measured at the 
lower of the cost and net 
realizable value. 
 
Replacement cost should be used 
in case of impairment losses in 
goods acquired for production. 
 
Disclosures are required. 
Inventories are measured at the 
lower of cost and market price. 
 
Market price is one of the two 
values: 
- Net realizable value (goods 
for sale). 
- Replacement cost (goods 
acquired for production). 
NCRF 27 (Financial 
Instruments 
Accounts receivable: 
- Impairment loss: difference 
between the carrying amount 
and the current value of cash-
flows deducted at the effective 
interest rate of the asset. 
 
Equity instruments: 
- If measured at cost. 
- Impairment loss: difference 
between the carrying amount 
and the best estimate of the 
asset’s fair value. 
Accounts receivable: 
- Collecting risks should be 
recognized. 
 
Other financial instruments: 
- Both financial instruments 
and short-term negotiable 
funds were measured at the 
lower of cost or market 
price. 
The NCRF 8 (Non-Current Assets Held for Sale and Discontinued Operations), NCRF 11 (Investment 
Property), NCRF 13 (Interests in Joint Ventures and Investments in Associates), NCRF 14 (Business 
Combinations), NCRF 15 (Investments in Subsidiaries and Consolidation), and NCRF 16 (Exploration 
for and Evaluations of Mineral Resources) refer that impairment assets are dealt by NCRF 12 
(Impairment of Assets). 
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Table 2 – Literature on the impact of IAS/IFRS and IAS/IFRS adapted standards adoption in Portugal 
Paper Objective Main findings 
Panel A: Portuguese studies on IFRS adoption 
Guerreiro 
(2006) 
Determinants of disclosure about 
IFRS adoption: transition period 
Larger companies, commercially internationalised, audited by Big4 auditing firms, and with lower 
leverage report more information. 
Morais e Curto 
(2008) 
Impact f IFRS adoption on financial 
information quality 
After the adoption of IFRS companies improved their earnings quality. The value relevance 
decreased with the adoption of IFRS. 
Guerreiro et al. 
(2008) 
Level of preparedness to adopt 
IFRS 
Low levels of preparedness. Larger companies with higher levels of commercial 
internationalisation, and audited by Big4 auditing firms, display higher levels of preparedness. 
Guerreiro et al. 
(2012a) 
How institutional pressures 
influence decision to adopt IFRS 
voluntarily 
Companies are willing to change their financial reporting institutional logic if it benefits them. The 
response to apply IFRS was largely predictable by virtue of the inherent nature and importance of 
such institutional pressures on them. 
 
Panel B: Portuguese studies on SNC adoption 
Guerreiro et al. 
(2012b) 
Level of preparedness to adopt 
SNC 
Low levels of preparedness. Organisational resistance to changes in the regulatory environment. 
Institutional factors had a positive influence on the degree of preparedness. 
Guerreiro et al. 
(2015) 
Understand the institutional change 
processes when a country uses 
adapted IFRS 
Evolving socio-economic and political context facilitated the adoption process. At the 
organisational field level, national professional and business associations shaped the criteria 
established at the political and economic level. At the organisational level, some accountants 
maintained structures of meaning associated with previous accounting system. 
Martins et al. 
(2014) 
Factors of disclosure compliance 
with NCRF 18 (Inventories) 
Older companies with more liquidity and lower profitability presented the highest level of 
compliance with SNC’s accounting standard NCRF 18 (Inventories). 
Oliveira et al. 
(2015a) 
Comparability of fair value-based 
valuation criteria for biological 
assets after SNC adoption 
Market values for dairy production of animals are inconsistent, reducing comparability level. 
Oliveira et al. 
(2015b) 
Examines the qualitative impact of 
the first-time adoption of SNC 
SNC adoption led to less conservative accounting practices suggesting that cultural aspects and 
country enforcement regimes did not influence the adoption of SNC. 
Botelho et al. 
(2015) 
Factors of disclosure compliance 
with NCRF 7 (Fixed Assets) 
Older companies with lower levels of foreign activity comply more with SNC’s accounting 





Table 3 – Studies on the effects of write-offs and goodwill impairment decisions 
 
Paper Country Objective Main Findings 
Panel A: Studies concerning write-offs decisions 
Strong and Meyer 
(1987) 
USA Understands how operating/ financial 
environment influences write-down 
decisions 
The strongest firm is more aggressive in recognizing write-downs on an ongoing 
basis. The poorest performing firms avoid write-downs due to operating losses, to 
avoid technical violations of debt covenants or to delay recognition of tax losses 
carry forwards until profitability is restored. A change in senior management 
influences a write-down decision. 
Elliot and Shaw 
(1988) 
USA Analyses of the earnings performance 
and the return behaviour from a long-
term and a short-term perspective 
Firms disclosing large discretionary write-offs are larger than other firms in their 
industries and more leveraged. They substantially underperform their industries in 
the years preceding and including the write-off year in terms of ROA and ROE. 
These performances are associated with significantly lower security returns in 
periods three years before, coincident with, and eighteen months following the 
announcement of the write-off. 
Zucca and 
Campbell (1992) 
USA Economic/financial consequences of 
discretionary accruals 
Majority of firms write-down their assets in a period of already below normal 
earnings (big bath). A quarter of the companies write-down their assets with other 
gain or unusual high earnings (income smoothing). Write-downs are used to 
manage earnings. No significant evidence of positive stock market reaction to the 
write-down announcement. 
Francis et al. 
(1996) 
USA Analyses if manipulation or 
impairment drives write-offs 
Both factors are important (manipulation and impairment factors). Managerial 
incentives do not explain inventory and PPE write-offs, but play a substantial role in 
explaining discretionary goodwill write-offs and restructuring changes. Inventory 
write-offs are seen as negative news but restructuring charges as good news. 
Rees et al. (1996) USA Analyses if firms systematically 
manage earnings in the year of the 
write-down, considering abnormal 
returns. 
Management acts opportunistically in the year of the write-down to improve future 
years’ reported earnings. Firms have experienced a permanent shift in their accrual 






Table 3 – Studies on the effects of write-offs and goodwill impairment decisions (cont.) 
 
Paper Country Objective Main Findings 
Riedl (2004) USA Characteristics of write-offs before 
and after SFAS 121. 
There is a higher association between write-offs and big-bath reporting behaviour 
after the standards implementation. This reflects more opportunistic reporting by 
managers, rather than the provision of their private information. 
Deming (2007) China Analyses if companies manipulate 
earnings by the impairment of assets 
Economic factors impact on reported impairment assets. Listed firms with negative 
earnings have taken a big bath after controlling for economic effects. 
Spear and Taylor 
(2011) 
USA Empirical evidence of asset write-
downs between 2001-2008 
Under-performing firms tend to take larger write-downs. Frequent write-downs take 
place during periods of economic recession. 
Siggelkow and 
Zulch (2013) 
Germany Factors influencing write-off decisions Negative association between write-offs and overall firm performance. Strong 
relation between write-offs and high earnings (income smoothing). No evidence is 
found for other capital market motives (big bath, management changes, earnings-
based compensation and leverage). German managers intend to influence tax 
payments and potential lenders. 
Chao and Horng 
(2013) 
Taiwan Examines whether managers use 
discretionary write-offs and abnormal 
accruals to reach targets and how 
corporate governance mechanisms 
react to such opportunistic behaviour 
Firms with larger discretionary write-offs have lower discretionary accruals. Both 
these earnings management tools are partial complements for earnings management 
and their magnitudes are determined jointly. Discretionary write-offs and abnormal 
returns are more associated among weakly governed firms, corporate governance 
constrains management discretionary behaviour. 
Alves (2013a) Portugal Investigates if IAS 36 reduces the 
magnitude and restricts the timing of 
reporting asset impairment, and 
analyses its relation with audit quality 
IAS 36 does not affect the magnitude of the reported assets impairment. Impairment 
firms engaged in either “big bath” or “income smoothing” behaviour. Firms audited 
by Big4 firms take significantly more impairments than firms audited by non-Big4. 
When there are incentives to under-report earnings the likelihood of taking an assets 
impairment will increase more for firms audited by non-Big4. 
Khalil and Simon 
(2014) 
Egypt Examines whether the contracting 
incentives and income smoothing can 
explain accounting choices 
Contracting incentives explain little variation in discretionary accruals. Managers 
are likely to smooth the reported earnings by managing the accrual component to 






Table 3 – Studies on the effects of write-offs and goodwill impairment decisions (cont.) 
 
Paper Country Objective Main Findings 
Panel B: Studies concerning goodwill impairment decisions 
Jordan and Clark 
(2004) 
USA Analyses if goodwill impairment 
charges in the year of adoption of 
SFAS 142 is related to the big bath  
Companies recording goodwill impairment charges possessed significantly lower 
earnings and also experienced a significantly higher rate of negative earnings. In the 
previous year both companies reported similar earnings levels and rates. 
Sevin and 
Schroeder (2005) 
USA Examines whether the provisions of 
SFAS 142 allow for big bath practices  
and the influence of firm 
Companies use SFAS 142 to engage in earnings management. Small firms 
experienced a significant greater negative impact and were much more likely than 
large firms to take big bath charges. 
Beatty and Weber 
(2006) 
USA Examines SFAS 142 adoption 
decisions and the economic incentives 
Firm’s debt contracting, bonus, turnover, and exchange delisting incentives affect 
their decisions to accelerate or delay these charges. 
Jordan et al. 
(2007) 
USA Analyses the reporting of goodwill, 
the presence of earnings management, 
and its persistence in the future 
Management selectively chose 2002 to recognize large impairment losses. After 
2002, impairment losses continued as big bath earnings management behaviour. 
Master-Stout et 
al. (2008) 
USA Examines the association between the 
goodwill impairment charges and the 
tenure of CEO 
Goodwill impairment is recognized when CEO are in office less than 3 years. 
Lapointe-Antunes 
et al., (2008) 
Canada Investigates if reporting incentives and 
constraints are associated with the 
magnitude of transitional goodwill 
impairment losses 
Firms have an incentive to overstate and understate transitional goodwill 
impairment losses. Educational background and independent audit committee 
constrain managerial opportunism. 
Godfrey and Koh 
(2009) 
USA Examines whether goodwill 
impairment write-offs reflect firm’s 
investment opportunities during the 
first years of US goodwill impairment 
accounting regime 
Impairment write-offs are negatively associated with firm’s underlying 
opportunities. These charges are also associated with leverage, size, and return on 
assets. 
Jahmani et al. 
(2010) 
USA Analyses if companies used SFAS 142 
to manage earnings 
Companies manage the volatility of earnings by avoiding taking goodwill 





Table 3 – Studies on the effects of write-offs and goodwill impairment decisions (cont.) 
Paper Country Objective Main Findings 
AbduGhazaleh et 
al. (2011) 
UK Examines the use of discretion in determining 
goodwill impairment losses and if this 
discretion reflects opportunistic reporting by 
managers or the provision of their private 
information 
Managers use discretion in the reporting of goodwill impairment losses. 
These charges are associated with CEO change, income smoothing, and big 
bath behaviours. These charges are associated with governance mechanism 
which suggests the argument that they do not behave opportunistically. 
Lee and Yoon 
(2012) 
US Examines the effect of SFAS 142 on the 
informativeness of earnings in terms of 
prediction of future operating cash flows and 
earnings persistence 
Earnings prediction of future operating cash flows and earnings persistence 
has improved after the enactment of SFAS 142, basically among firms with 
high levels of discretionary accruals. 
Alves (2013b) Portugal Analyzes if companies use goodwill 
impairment losses to manage earnings 
Goodwill is significantly positively related to earnings management. IAS36 




Austria Investigates de relationship between goodwill 
and cost of capital 
Companies that have carried out goodwill impairment tend to display higher 
cost of capital. But those that report goodwill and are audited by a Big4 
auditor tend to display lower cost of capital. 
Bepari and 
Mollik (2015) 
Australia Analyzes the effect of audit quality on firms’ 
compliance with IFRS for goodwill impairment 
testing and disclosure 
Compliance level is different between firms audited by Big4 and non-Big4 
firms. Auditing Committee member’s accounting and finance backgrounds 
are positively associated with compliance level. 
Jordan and Clark 
(2015) 
Canada Examines the relation between goodwill 
impairments and opportunistic behaviour 
Goodwill impairment charges are not being recorded opportunistically to 
take big baths but to provide relevant information to financial users. 
 
Panel C: Studies the degree of compliance with disclosure requirements 
Carlin et al. 
(2010) 
Singapore Assess the degree of compliance with 
disclosure requirements of IAS36 
Poor compliance regarding disclosures on cash-generating units definition, 
goodwill allocation and assumptions to estimate cash-generating units 
recoverable amounts. 
Carlin and Finch 
(2011) 
Australia Analyses goodwill impairment testing practices 
and compliance with disclosure requirements 
of IFRS 
Systematic non-compliance with disclosure requirements of IFRS goodwill 





Table 3 – Studies on the effects of write-offs and goodwill impairment decisions (cont.) 
Paper Country Objective Main Findings 
Guthrie and Pang 
(2013) 
Australia Examines goodwill reporting practices 
from 2005 to 2010 and explores the 
level of compliance with disclosure 
requirements regarding impairment 
testing 
Compliance with the standards’ goodwill allocation requirements generally 
improved, but there was non-compliance for all reporting periods. 
Kaiying Ji (2013) Australia Investigates firms are delaying or 
avoiding goodwill impairment 
Evidence of delayed and avoided goodwill impairment. 
Carvalho et al. 
(2016a) 
Portugal Investigate the magnitude of goodwill 
recognised in business combinations 
during 2005 to 2009 by Portuguese 
listed companies and analyses the 
level of compliance with the main 
disclosure requirements of IFRS 3. 
The amounts of goodwill are highly material, but the value of identifiable intangible 
assets in those acquisitions is very low. There is a reduced level of compliance with 












Size Total assetst-1 (Million Euros) +
Profitability Return on assets = Pre-impairment losses & tax earningst-1 / Total assetst-1 ?
Earnings growth rate = (Pre-impairment losses & tax earningst - Pre-
impairment losses & tax earningst-1)/Pre-impairment losses & tax earningst-1
?
Leverage Debt ratio = Total liabilitiest-1 / Total assetst-1 ?
Tax measurement 
criteria
Dummy variable = 1 if the company adopts tax measurment criteria to assess 




























Table 5 – Descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables 
Variables Measurement N Mean Minimum Maximum
Std. 
Deviation
Panel A: Continuous variables
CIIL Index 43 1.979 0.000 40.945 7.012
Size Million Euros 43 308.946 0.555 2233.138 463.804
Return on assets Ratio 43 0.014 -0.324 0.442 0.139
Earnings growth rate Ratio 43 0.369 -1.288 3.762 1.042
Leverage Ratio 43 1.039 0.090 5.412 0.935
Panel B: categorical variables Dummy Frequency Percentage
Tax measurement criteria = 1 43 4 9%
= 0 39 91%
Management compenssation = 1 43 23 54%
= 0 20 46%
Definiton of variables: CIIL = comparability index for impairment losses; Size = total assets t-1; Leverage = total
liabilities t-1 / total assets t-1; Return on assets = pre-impairment losses & tax earnings t-1 / total assets t-1); Earnings
growth rate = (pre-impairment losses & tax earnings t - pre-impairment losses & tax earnings t-1) / pre-impairment losses
& tax earnings t-1; Tax measurement criteria = 1 if the company uses tax measurement criteria to assess impairment



























Total Assets Million Euros 43 411.399 308.946 -0.941 b 0.347
(83.627) (68.026)
Total Liabilities Million Euros 43 464.018 398.248 -1.257 b 0.209
(80.275) (68.026)
Equity Million Euros 43 -18.481 -88.794 -0.292 b 0.771
(14.494) (12.785)
Pre-impairment losses 
& tax earnings Million Euros 43 -7.961 -9.719 -1.501 c 0.133
(0.452) (1.007)
Impairment losses Million Euros 43 0.236 2.110 -0.573 c 0.567
(0.032) (0.036)
b
 Based on positive ranks
c
 Based on negative ranks
Raw variables Measurement N









Table 7 – Differences on average values of comparability index  
CIIL








Definiton of variables: CIIL = comparability index for impairment losses; Tax measurement criteria = 1 if the




























Table 8 – Profile of companies with high (low) impact of impairment losses 
High Impact Low Impact
N=5 N=38
Size (Total assets t-1) 518.910 281.319 -0.947 0.364
Total liabilities (t-1) 1,047.743 312.788 -0.871 0.405
Equity (t-1) -528.833 -30.894 -0.834 0.427
Pre-impairment losses & tax earnings (t-1) -43.750 -2.849 -1.515 0.138
Impairment losses (t-1) -0.689 2.478 -1.251 0.226
Return on assets -0.060 0.019 -1.478 0.149
Earnings growth rate 0.357 0.371 -0.720 0.495
Leverage 1.241 1.013 -0.834 0.427
Tax measurement criteria (=1) 2 2
Management compensation (=1) 2 21
Definiton of variables: CIIL = comparability index for impairment losses; Size = total assets t-1; Leverage =
total liabilities t-1 / total assets t-1; Return on assets = pre-impairment losses & tax earnings t-1 / total assets t-1 ); 
Earnings growth rate = (pre-impairment losses & taxearnings t - pre-impairment losses & taxearnings t-1) / pre-
impairment losses & tax earnings t-1; Tax measurement criteria = 1 if the company uses tax measurement
criteria to assess impairment losses, and 0 otherwise; Management compensation = 1 if company's




























Table 9 – Correlation matrix 
Panel A: Continuous variables
(1) CIIL 1.000
(2) Size 0.312 ** 1.000
(3) Return on assets -0.360 ** -0.231 1.000
(4) Earnings growth rate 0.091 -0.144 0.145 1.000
(5) Leverage 0.322 ** 0.372 ** -0.661 *** -0.153 1.000
(6) Tax measurement criteria 0.202 -0.123 -0.039 0.058 -0.194 1.000
(7) Management compensation -0.191 -0.278 0.402 *** 0.051 -0.368 ** -0.183 1.000
Correlation is significant at the ***0.01 level, **0.05 level, and 0.1 level (2-tailed)
Panel B: Categorical variables





















Table 10 – Regression model 
B Std. Error t
Value inflated 
factors
Intercept -0.157 0.204 -0.771
Size + 0.236 0.137 1.715 †† 1.221
Return on assets ? -0.168 0.174 -0.965 1.954
Earnings growth rate ? 0.155 0.127 1.219 1.038
Leverage ? 0.228 0.188 1.213 2.293
Tax measurement criteria ? 1.051 0.460 2.284 ** 1.234









Notes: Significance at ***0.01 level, **0.05 level, and *0.1 level (2-tailed)
             Significance at †††0.01 level, ††0.05 level, and †0.1 level (1-tailed)
Definiton of variables: CIIL = comparability index for impairment losses; Size = total assets t-1; Leverage =
total liabilities t-1 / total assets t-1; Return on assets = pre-impairment losses & tax earnings t-1 / total assets t-
1); Earnings growth rate = (pre-impairment losses & taxearnings t - pre-impairment losses & taxearnings t-
1) / pre-impairment losses & tax earnings t-1; Tax measurement criteria = 1 if the company uses tax
measurement criteria to assess impairment losses, and 0 otherwise; Management compensation = 1 if






                                               
1
 According to Cooke (1998, p. 214) the main “advantage of normal scores is that resulting tests have 
exact statistical properties because a) significance levels can be determined, b) the F and t-test are 
meaningful and c) the power of F and t-tests may be used. In addition, the regression coefficients derived 
using normal scores are meaningful”. Finally, the normal scores approach has the advantage of 
overcoming problems of non-normal dependent variables, monotonicity and non-linearity. 
